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T

wo decades have passed since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, anyone
under thirty has virtually no personal memory of the conflict, and the
generation born after the Soviet Union’s collapse is reaching adulthood. In that
time talk of the “post-Cold War” has become less common, especially with the
onset of the War on Terrorism, but nothing has quite taken its place.
One might point to the tendency of recent debate to focus on specific,
immediate issues (Iraq, Afghanistan, NATO) rather than more comprehensive
approaches to world affairs as an element, but the preceding decade saw a
profusion of “big picture” theories. The theories encompassed everything from
a Hegelian “end to history” to clashes of civilizations; from a reaffirmation of
realpolitik to a new dawn for collective security; from neoliberal globalization to neo-mercantilist geoeconomics (with American imperium or American
decline part of the stakes); from Malthusian catastrophe to postindustrial (or
even posthuman) liberation from nature’s constraint. These images inevitably
oversimplified the reality they described, and wider discussion tended to simplify them further still—but the resulting collection of ideas still has some
explanatory power.
A collection of partial explanations seems like a letdown to many compared with the more focused strategizing of the Cold War era. However, the
comparisons between a bewildering present and a clearer past are themselves
overly simplistic. The Cold War, too, interacted with other trends, developments, movements, and forces inside an even larger arena, for example, the
decolonization in Africa and Asia (without which superpower competition in
the Third World is scarcely comprehensible). At the same time those presenting
globalization, the “clash of civilizations,” or ecological constraints as the key
to understanding the twenty-first century speak of forces that are age-old, and
which assumed their present shape no later than the 1970s, well before the Cold
War’s end.
Simply put, a grand unifying theory of international relations has
always been (and perhaps always will be) chimerical. Nonetheless, a broad
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view of the international situation as it actually developed over the last two
decades is indispensable to the crafting of coherent, focused policy. The compromise suggested here focuses on key trends in place of the elusive unified
image, with trends in six areas over the last twenty years (great power conflict,
intrastate war, neoliberal globalization, the distribution of global output, world
manufacturing and the balance of trade, resource politics, and international
cooperation) particularly worthy of note.

Great Power Conflict
After the Soviet bloc’s implosion the consensus among security analysts was that no conflict comparable to the Cold War would emerge for a long
time. Specifically, the reduction of significant political differences among the
largest and most powerful states (especially the end of the ideological conflict
and the division of Europe), and the sharp shift in the military balance of power
(which suggested the United States would not face a large peer competitor for
decades), reduced the prospect of a great power war to a much smaller role in
both international affairs and defense planning than at any time since 1945.
In addition, the 1990s witnessed improved relations between Russia
and China, and later China and India, bringing the risk of armed conflict among
the three continental giants of Asia to a historic low.1 The political status of
Taiwan, and other Chinese territorial and maritime claims in the East and South
China Seas, remain objects of contention, and Chinese relations with Taiwan
and Japan deteriorated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Even the low point in
Sino-Taiwanese relations in 1996 was a far cry from the violence of the 1950s,
and China’s relations with Japan and Taiwan have markedly improved since
then.2 Indeed, China became far less likely to advocate force in disputes with
its neighbors since the 1980s. Rather, its relations with these nations (and the
United States) are now characterized far more by economic interconnection
than military competition. As a result, Cold War-style crises and proxy wars
have been virtually eliminated, with the situation of Taiwan in 1996 and postSoviet Georgia the most significant exceptions.
The prospect of the European Union (EU) or Japan arming on a significant scale or fighting with other major powers (for instance, Japan confronting
Russia) is even more remote. The white papers of major European powers
recognize no direct state threats to their security, from one another, or from
powers outside the EU. If anything, the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath only served to reinforce Europe’s trend toward lower defense spending,
slowing even more the EU’s already long-delayed development of a common
military capability.3

Intrastate War Supplants Interstate War
Following the Cold War, warfare and its threat became largely confined to what Thomas P.M. Barnett terms the “Non-Integrating Gap.” This
gap is defined as the least-developed and least-globalized regions inhabited by
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“roughly one-third of humanity,” encompassing “the Caribbean rim, the Andes
portion of South America, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, the Middle East, and
most of southeast Asia.”4 War is
now a more frequent occurrence
. . . the interstate wars of the
in this region, but this is mainly
post-1990 period tended to be
due to the increased incidence of
brief and of limited intensity. . .
intrastate warfare pitting states
against non-state actors in internal conflicts, while interstate wars become less common.5 The territory of the
former Soviet Union has witnessed just two interstate wars (the 1993-1994
Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War), while Latin
America has experienced one (the 1995 Cenepa War). Despite these periodic
incidents, large-scale interstate violence has been absent from the Korean and
Arab-Israeli conflicts, as well as from Southeast Asia, with the 1999 Kargil
War the notable exception along the Indo-Pakistani frontier.
It is noteworthy that these conflicts involved a great power pitted against
a markedly weaker state that did not enjoy significant material support from
other great powers (as US actions against Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan; or
Russia’s against Georgia). At the same time, none of the wars between smaller
states evolved into Cold War-style proxy wars between larger powers. It is
also worth noting that initiators of interstate conflicts have often attempted to
“disguise” their action as an aspect of an intrastate conflict (as in Kargil and
the Congo), while wars ending with regime change or occupation tend to be
followed by a lengthier, bloodier phase of intrastate warfare (the post-invasion
Iraq and Afghanistan).
It is not surprising that the interstate wars of the post-1990 period
tended to be brief and of limited intensity (a comparison between the Third
and Fourth Indo-Pakistani Wars makes the point), with no conflict comparable
to the Korean, Vietnam, or Iran-Iraq wars taking place, with reports of annual
battle-deaths worldwide falling dramatically since the Cold War era.6 The
emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, counterinsurgency, non-state terrorism, and urban and computer warfare, rather than conventional war-fighting,
also reflect the unevenness of these conflicts. Indeed, the changing character
of military missions has revived doubts about the appropriateness of the traditional orientation of major armed forces toward conventional warfighting in
their organization and procurement, with the United States being no exception
to this pattern.

Neoliberal Globalization, Robust but Problematic
In 1992, Lester Thurow declared globalization dead in his influential
book Head to Head, predicting a movement to neo-mercantilist trading blocs.7
Many pundits repeated the claim following the 1997-1998 financial meltdown,
and again after 9/11. Yet the process of globalization continued inexorably
through these years. Global exports grew a staggering 6.7 percent a year from
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1992 to 2008, these quantitative changes reflecting important qualitative ones,
as exemplified by the unprecedented development of international supply
chains and global financial flows.8 The World Trade Organization (WTO) that
institutionalized the process now counts 153 nations as members, including
virtually all the major economies (with Russia recently applying for membership). The speculation that the end to this global movement had finally arrived
with the 2008 financial crisis again proved premature. Of course, states never
stopped pursuing economic nationalistic policies; their behavior, however, has
been more pragmatic than ideological, and markedly constrained, while direct
challenges to globalization have been marginal, especially inside the major
industrialized economies.
Still, the world’s economic performance during the present (1970s
onward) round of globalization has been problematic. Critics regularly point to
the increased financial instability epitomized by the 1997-1998 and 2008 crises,
and the growing inequality between and within nations.9 While this is often
rationalized as the unavoidable price of economic growth, that growth has actually proven mediocre. According to the WTO, per capita Gross World Product
(GWP) grew at slightly more than 3 percent a year from 1950 to 1973. From 1973
to 2006, it grew half as rapidly at just 1.2 percent each year.10 One study even
suggests that growth after 1980 barely kept pace with the population increase.11
This pattern has been evident in both rich and poor nations, with their
government finances reflecting the problem. While the debt-to-GDP ratio of the
major industrial countries fell from the 1940s through the 1970s, it has more
than doubled since 1974, a problem again exacerbated by the 2008 financial
crisis.12 The estimated US Federal deficit for the period 2009-2011 comes to
over $4 trillion, bringing America’s national debt to approximately $14 trillion
(roughly 100 percent of GDP, a ratio not seen since World War II), with sharply
elevated deficits expected for years to come.13 Japan’s debt is now approaching
200 percent of its GDP.14 These same events also precipitated the sovereign debt
crisis directly afflicting several EU members, and the integrity of the entire EU.
Such a situation is definitely not supportable, but the prospects for remediation
remain unclear. Meanwhile, fears of similar (or even greater) crises in the near
future, before the world’s economies have time to recover, loom large, with
theories about the “next one” prominent in the world press.
Additionally, the greater speed, density, and complexity of international
communications and transport that facilitate the legal flow of goods, services,
and people are the same measures that in many cases facilitate criminal and terrorist activity, illegal migration, and their associated problems, often magnified
by the uncertainties and stresses created by the global economy. There are also
a number of facts supporting the argument that globalization’s apparent discrediting of secular, material alternatives to neoliberalism have contributed to
ethnic and sectarian conflict and violent religious fundamentalism by fostering
a preoccupation with identity, often resulting in the channeling of political dissatisfaction into cultural and religious outlets.15 Globalization may not entirely
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account for al Qaeda’s emergence, but its emergence would be inconceivable
without globalization.

Global Output, World Manufacturing, and the Balance of Trade
In the early 1990s, economic analysts predicted that the twenty-first
century would see a three-way competition between the United States, Japan,
and a Germany-led Europe.16 Nonetheless, slow growth in the industrialized
world (especially Japan and Germany) markedly reduced their share of GWP.
Meanwhile China, once ignored in such discussions, proved to be the outstanding exception to the general pattern of slow economic growth, sustaining
double-digit rates through these years. Accordingly, as of 2008 it accounted for
7 percent of GWP, and a massive 17 percent of world manufacturing, making
it a close second to the United States in this area, with the likely prospect of
being first quite soon.17 As the situation stands, China is the world’s largest
exporter, possessing the largest trade surplus, largest positive account balance,
and largest reserve of foreign exchange, and enjoys all the financial influence
this ranking entails. More broadly, the balance of global manufacturing and
trade has shifted to East Asia, with the development of China and other regional
industrial powers more than offsetting Japan’s (relative) decline.18
East Asia’s economies have integrated in the course of their expansion,
but this process pales when compared with European integration. The evolution
of the 12-nation European Economic Community (EEC) into today’s 27-nation
EU has permitted the institution to preserve its share of GWP (14 percent
larger than the United States) and global manufacturing (over 50 percent larger
than that of the United States or China).19 Its common currency challenges the
American dollar in ways the German mark and French franc never could.
At the same time, the US position has changed in ways understated by
its share of GWP, for example, its declining share of world manufacturing.20
Such events reflect not only the rapid growth of developing nations (China), but
the receding of manufacturing as a part of the total US economy, leaving the
country as a net importer of manufactured goods (and eliminating its ability to
finance other imports, like oil).21 This situation has enlarged the merchandise
trade deficits, chronic since the 1970s, to 5 to 6 percent of US GDP in the 20042008 period. These deficits are only partially offset by the surplus in service
exports and returns on foreign investment, placing the United States in the
current position of possessing the world’s largest account imbalance (over $700
billion as of 2008).22 Foreign purchases of government securities are crucial
to financing America’s budget deficit, while low US savings rates increases
dependence on foreign capital. and reinforces the country’s status as the world’s
largest debtor.23
As the 2008 financial crisis raised doubts about the course pursued by
fiscally troubled governments around the world, it may have also marked a shift
in this pattern. Not only is China’s growth likely to slow in the coming years,
but its socially, ecologically, and politically costly export-oriented strategy may
have run its course.24 Meanwhile, the EU’s sovereign debt crisis has revived
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the question of whether the organization has expanded too far and too fast,
underlining its frailty.25 At the same time, the US fiscal and trading positions
are widely viewed as unsustainable, endangering America’s international preeminence. How these three primary actors are able to successfully resolve their
economic challenges remains to be seen.

Resource Politics Never Went Away
Since the 1970s, a combination of actions and theorizing related to
economic production and its shift from tangible goods to information; technological hyperbole regarding everything from new energy sources and material
science to the prospects for accessing the resources of the seas and space; and
an optimism related to the power of markets to overcome every problem; have
combined to produce a Cornucopian belief that ecological “limits to growth”
are irrelevant. In the late 1990s, a short period of rapid American growth widely
associated with the “New Economy” seemed to validate this thinking.
The period’s low commodity prices also contributed powerfully to this
view. The subsequent price shocks, however (exemplified by the rise in oil prices
that sparked the “food and fuel crisis” of 2006-8, and contributed to the 2008
financial crisis), each have been a reminder that the world economy remains
dependent on the Earth’s limited natural resources.26 Indeed, the growth in the
consumption of natural resources increased steadily, so that the world economy
was using the resources of 1.2 “Earth-equivalents” by 1999 and 1.4 by 2008. We
are likely to consume the resources of two Earth-equivalents by 2030 if present
trends continue.27 Where energy specifically is concerned, the evidence pointing to a “significant, prolonged and continuing contraction in production . . .
beginning by the 2020s is considerable,” with many suggesting that the moment
of global “peak oil” may already be at hand, with anthropogenic climate change
already a contributor to economic and political instability.28
The realities associated with resource politics have been reminders of
one important limit to globalization—the susceptibility of natural resources
(oil and gas) to territorial control. Consequently, energy exporters have not
only vastly increased their earnings, but have translated oil and gas reserves
into financial and political influence, including investments in the ownership
of foreign assets. (Russia is the most dramatic case, but this pattern extends to
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Venezuela, and others.) Stateowned oil companies and the associated sovereign wealth funds have been so
prominent that some observers speak of the “return” of state capitalism.29
High energy prices also impacted the trade balances of energy consuming states in exactly the opposite manner (net oil imports adding nearly $490
billion to the US trade deficit in the record year of 2008), while inspiring their
governments to be more active in securing energy supplies.30 American and
Chinese actions in this arena have received the most attention, but all major
countries have been involved in these maneuverings, some quite surprisingly
so, such as France’s establishment of a base in the UAE in 2009.
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International Cooperation on Global Issues
The Cold War’s end saw nothing comparable to the hopes for improved
world government that ran high after World War II. Yet there was widespread
anticipation of a new era of routine, institutionalized, effective, international
cooperation across a gamut of issues. That cooperation was to be based on the
enlightened recognition of shared interests, a respect for international law, and
an enlarged appreciation of national security beyond the traditional physical
threats to states. There was talk of a new era of collective security, with the
international community working through the United Nations to counter not
only interstate aggression, but human rights abuses, state failure, and humanitarian disasters (as seen in the Horn of Africa and the Balkans). The end of the
superpower arms race opened new opportunities for curbing nuclear proliferation, resulting in massive reductions in the American and Russian nuclear
stockpiles, as well as producing a new Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The 1992 Rio Summit formally extended international cooperation into the area
of development and environmental protection, with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
and the 2000 Millennium Declaration building on its precedents.
By and large, however, the envisaged cooperation never materialized.
The United States was routinely at odds with Russia and China at the United
Nations, as if the Cold War still continued. The international community, as
a whole, demonstrated little appetite for messy, open-ended humanitarian
interventions and nation-building projects. Rwanda was perhaps the greatest
example of the organization’s failure to act, but an even greater problem is
manifest in the “deficit” of peacekeeping efforts. Even when some action was
forthcoming, it tended to be belated in nature and inadequate.31 In the nuclear
arena, not only did the CTBT never enter into force, but the more ambitious
goals of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were never attained, with
its goal of disarmament remaining as remote as ever. India and Pakistan, meanwhile, made their nuclear status official, and North Korea tested its first bomb.
At the same time, progress toward the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol and the
Millennium Declaration, or even the Rio Summit—modest to begin with—has
been lackluster, with the developed nations falling short of their commitments.
In fact, much of the improvement that did occur came from sources other than
those identified for the action.32 Moments of crisis produced greater collaboration, as in the aftermath of 9/11, or the 2008 economic crisis, but this always
occurred within measured limits. It was only in the arena of free trade that
international cooperation has been consistently forthcoming and advancing.
In retrospect, many of these disappointments were all too predictable,
as they assumed an implausible break with established national behavior. Yet
the point that no great change actually occurred in this era is too important to
overlook, given the global nature of the economic and security problems presently confronting the world.
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Conclusions and Implications
Relative calm has prevailed among the great powers since the demise
of the Soviet Union. Large-scale warfare remains a possibility, but by and large
interstate war has been confined to the margins of the international system,
and limited in its intensity, with the operational realities of the world’s major
armed forces characterized by alternative missions. Neoliberal globalization
has been robust but economically problematic, characterized by slow growth,
financial instability, and other factors contributing to social and political stress.
East Asia, and especially China, constituted the principal exception to the slow
growth characterizing these decades. East Asia has massively increased its
share of world manufacturing, exports, and exchange reserves, while at the
same time the EU expanded and consolidated the continent’s resources, with
some “game-changing” implications (like the euro). Additionally, rising commodity prices have resulted in booms among resource exporters, particularly
energy exporters, which have also permitted these nations to enjoy greater
political leverage.
As a result, while the United States remains in a class of its own with
regard to military power, and its large national market, there have been some
substantial shifts in economic power from the United States and Japan to other
actors over the past two decades. This is particularly true of China, the EU, and
a select number of energy exporters, resulting in a more complex and diffuse
distribution of power. At the same time the relationships of the major powers
are less defined by concerns related to traditional, state-centered threats than at
any time since the nineteenth century, if not earlier. While these may not be the
traditional threats, they do present an unprecedented array of non-traditional
security concerns in areas like energy, the environment, and finance, and physical threats presented by non-state actors, such as international terrorism and
high-seas piracy. Despite these mounting threats, cooperation has consistently
fallen short of the levels hoped for in the early 1990s.
Many of the current trends seem likely to continue through the foreseeable future. The interaction of the crises of the past several years (especially in
energy and international finance) combined with long-mounting stresses in the
global economy (slow growth, debt, ecological pressure) all raise the possibility
of changes in some areas of development, particularly if these changes impact
the world’s three principal loci of economic power: China, the European Union,
and the United States. China may continue to grow rapidly, though perhaps
less so as it matures, and begins to pursue goals beyond the mere maximizing
of GDP. Even if the EU’s attempts at integration and expansion recede (as is
plausible), Europe as a whole is likely to remain powerful, even if that power is
less extensive and well-organized.
Meanwhile the US position is not unlike what the “declinists” of the
1980s and early 1990s anticipated. The most significant direct challenges to
the United States some twenty years after the Cold War are not military, but
economic: deindustrialization, balance of payments problems, debt, and surviving inside an ever-more integrated global economy and strained ecosystem.
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Relations among the great powers may yet grow more intense, but economic
crisis seems the most likely cause of any future conflict, with the less traditional
dimensions of security presenting the most realistic obstacles to the United
States’ freedom of action if such events ever do materialize.
Accordingly, the logical focus for US policy is the correction of the
country’s balance of payments problems on a fiscally and ecologically sustainable basis. China’s shift away from an export-oriented strategy may provide
some relief in this area, but economically heterodox action will be vital, including the establishment of an energy policy designed to sharply reduce oil imports
(and ultimately eliminate our dependence on fossil fuels); and an industrial
policy which expands American manufacturing in proportion to the rest of its
economy (ideally, to 16 percent of GDP as a minimum, short-term goal), as the
overall economy grows.33
Rebuilding the country’s long-neglected infrastructure (not least its
energy and transport systems), and investment in the research and development
of alternative energy (especially renewable energy)—projects far larger in scale
than anything provided under recent stimulus schemes—are obvious courses of
action. More broadly, there needs to be an emphasis on supporting capital- and
knowledge-intensive industries. The development of these industries is reliant
on proprietary know-how “acquired only by . . . many years of learning by
doing.” These arenas are where advanced nations can still establish a long-term
comparative advantage. If America is to be successful in such endeavors, it
needs to begin restoring its competitiveness in the manufacturing arena outside
the defense and aerospace sectors.34
Of course, financing the needed investments is a daunting challenge
given not only their scale, but the current Federal deficit, the number of limited
options for cutting spending or increasing revenue, and the fact that meaningful results may take years to achieve.35 Additionally, it is difficult to imagine
a successful “reindustrialization” of America without reining in speculative
financing (as the United States did successfully in the 1930s), along with closer
management of trade (to create enough space in which recovery is possible).
Finally, long-term success in such a program will likely require its being part
of a broader, sustained effort to redress the imbalances and vulnerabilities
inherent in the international economic system. The need for greater global integration is underscored by the crises of the last several years, and the limits of
governmental responses to them. It is true that, at present, much of this seems
impossible, but the alternative may, in fact, prove intolerable.
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